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I discuss the impact of computer progress on nuclear war policy, both by enabling more accurate
nuclear winter simulations and by affecting the probability of war starting accidentally. I argue
that from a cosmic perspective, humanity’s track record of risk mitigation is inexcusably pathetic,
jeopardizing the potential for life to flourish for billions of years.
I. S.T.U.P.I.D.
13.8 billion years after our Big Bang, about 500
years after inventing the printing press, we humans de-
FIG. 1: We humans have invested great resources
and ingenuity in building the Spectacular Thermonuclear
Unpredictable Population Incineration Device, (acronym
S.T.U.P.I.D.), whose two adjustable knobs determine its ex-
plosive power X and the probability P that it goes off spon-
taneously in any given year.
∗Based on my talk at the symposium The Dynamics of Possible
Nuclear Extinction held February 28–March 1 2015 at The New
York Academy of Medicine: http://totalwebcasting.com/view/
?id=hcf
cided to build a contraption called the Spectacular
Thermonuclear Unpredictable Population Incineration
Device, abbreviated STUPID. It’s arguably the the most
costly device ever built on this beautiful spinning ball
in space that we inhabit, but the cost hasn’t prevented
many people from saying that building and maintaining
it was a good idea. This may seem odd, given that es-
sentially nobody on our ball wants STUPID to ever get
used.
It has only two knobs on the outside, labeled X and
P , but despite this apparent simplicity, it’s actually a
very complicated device. It’s a bit like a Rube Goldberg
machine inside, so complex that not a single person on
our planet understands how 100% of it works. Indeed, it
was so complicated to build that it took the talents and
resources of more than one country who worked really
hard on it for many many years. Many of the world’s
top physicists and engineers worked to invent and build
the technology for doing what this device does: creating
massive explosions around the planet. But that was only
part of the effort that went into it: to overcome human
inhibitions towards triggering the explosions, STUPID
also involves state-of-the-art social engineering, putting
people in special uniforms and using peer pressure and
the latest social coercion techniques to make people do
things they normally wouldn’t do. Fake alerts are cre-
ated where people who refuse to follow missile launch
protocols are fired and replaced, and so on.
Let’s now focus on how STUPID works. What are
these two knobs? The X-knob determines the total ex-
plosive power of the device. The P -knob determines the
probability that this thing will go off during any random
year for whatever reason. As we’ll see, one of the nifty
features of it is that it can spontaneously go off even if
nobody wants it to.
One can tune the settings of these two knobs, X and
P . Let’s look a bit at how the setting of these two dials
has evolved over time. The X-knob was set to 0 until
1945, when we physicists figured out how to turn it up.
We started below 20 kilotons with the Hiroshima and
Nagasaki bombs, and by the time we got to the “Tsar
Bomba” in 1961, we were up to 50 megatons — thousands
of times more powerful. The number of bombs also grew
dramatically, peaking around 63,000 in the mid 1980’s,
dropping for a while and then holding steady around
16,000 hydrogen bombs in recent years, about 4,000 of
which are on hair-trigger alert, meaning that they can
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2FIG. 2: Average cooling (in ◦C) during the first two summers after a full-scale nuclear war between the US and Russia.
Reproduced with permission from [7].
be launched on a few minutes’ notice [1]. Although those
who decided to build STUPID argued that they had con-
sidered all factors and had everything under control, it
eventually emerged that they had missed at least three
crucial details.
II. NUCLEAR WINTER
First, radiation risks had been underestimated, and
over $2Bn in compensation has been paid out to vic-
tims of radiation exposure from uranium handling and
nuclear tests in the US alone [2]. Second, it was discov-
ered that using STUPID had the potential of causing a
nuclear winter, which wasn’t realized until about four
decades after STUPID’s inauguration—oops! Regard-
less of whose cities burned, massive amounts of smoke
reaching the upper troposphere would spread around the
globe, blocking out enough sunlight to transform sum-
mers into winters, much like when an asteroid or su-
pervolcano caused a mass extinction in the past. When
the alarm was sounded by both US and Soviet scientists
in the 1980’s [3–6], this contributed to the decision of
Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev to start turning
town the X-knob.
Today’s climate models are significantly better than
those run on the supercomputers of the 1980’s, whose
computational power was inferior to that of your smart-
phone. This enables more accurate nuclear winter fore-
casts. Figure 2 (reproduced from [7]) shows the average
change in surface air temperature (in degrees Celsius)
during the first two summers after a full-scale nuclear
war depositing 150 megatons of smoke into the upper
troposphere.
3This calculation used a state-of-the-art general circu-
lation model from NASA [8], which includes a module
to calculate the transport and removal of aerosol parti-
cles [9], as well as a full ocean general circulation model
with calculated sea ice, thus allowing the ocean to re-
spond quickly at the surface and on yearly timescales
in the deeper ocean. This was the first time that an
atmosphere-ocean general circulation model was used in
this context, and the first time that the time horizon was
extended to a full decade. Unfortunately, the increased
accuracy has revealed gloomier findings: Figure 1 shows
cooling by about 20◦C (36◦ Fahrenheit) in much of the
core farming regions of the US, Europe, Russia and China
(by 35◦C in parts of Russia) for the first two summers,
and about half that even a full decade later.
What does that mean in plain English? One doesn’t
need much farming experience to conclude that near-
freezing summer temperatures for years would eliminate
most of our food production. It’s hard to predict exactly
what would happen after thousands of Earth’s largest
cities are reduced to rubble and global infrastructure col-
lapses, but whatever small fraction of all humans don’t
succumb to starvation, hypothermia or disease would
need to cope with roving armed gangs desperate for food.
Given the specter of Nuclear Winter, it has been ar-
gued that the traditional nuclear doctrine of Mutual As-
sured Destruction (MAD) has been replaced by Self-
Assured Destruction (SAD) [10]: even if one of the two
superpowers were able to launch its full nuclear arsenal
against the other without any retaliation whatsoever, Nu-
clear Winter would assure its self-destruction. Needless
to say, there are many uncertainties in Nuclear Winter
predictions, for example in how much smoke is produced
and how high up it gets, which determines its longevity.
Given this uncertainty, there is absolutely no basis for
arguing that the X-knob is currently set low enough to
guarantee the survival of most humans.
III. ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR
Let’s turn to the other knob, P : the probability that
STUPID just goes kaboom for whatever reason. A third
thing that the STUPID builders overlooked was that P
is set to an irrationally large value. My own guess is
that the most likely way we’ll get a nuclear war going is
by accident (which can also include people through var-
ious sorts of misunderstandings). We don’t know what
P is and estimates vary widely. However, we know for
sure that it’s not zero, since there have been large num-
bers of close calls caused by all sorts of things: computer
malfunction, power failure, faulty intelligence, navigation
error, bomber crash, satellite explosion, etc. [11]. In fact,
if it weren’t for heroic acts of certain individuals—for ex-
ample Vasilii Arkhipov and Stanislav Petrov—we might
already have had a global nuclear war.
What about the change of P over time — how has P
changed? Even though P certainly dropped after 1990,
when tensions subsided between the US and Russia, it
might very well have gone up quite a bit again, and
there are various reasons for this. The recent increase
in mistrust and saber-rattling between the US and Rus-
sia obviously increases P , but there are also other seem-
ingly unrelated developments that can potentially make
P larger. As just one small example among many that
have been discussed, the US plan to replace 2 out of the
24 Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles by con-
ventional warheads, allegedly for potential use against
North Korea, provides opportunities for misunderstand-
ing. An adversary seeing this missile coming and consid-
ering a nuclear response would have no way of knowing
what kind of warhead it has.
Let me end talking about the impact of new tech-
nology on P , the risk of accidental nuclear war. Mu-
tually Assured Destruction worked well when missiles
were accurate enough to destroy a city but not accu-
rate enough to destroy a silo. That made it very disad-
vantageous to launch any kind of first strike. Progress
in computerized navigation has enabled much more pre-
cise targeting of missiles, reducing the disadvantage of a
first strike, increasing P . Having accurate submarine-
launched ballistic missiles near their targets also im-
proves the prospects for a first strike. Most nuclear mis-
sile silos are within 2000 km of an ocean, from which
submarine-launched ballistic missiles can destroy them
in 7-13 minutes depending on how “depressed” their tra-
jectory is [12]. These shorter flight times give less time for
the enemy to react, potentially making decision-makers
jumpier, and as a result, both the US and Russia have
now further increased P by placing thousands of missiles
on alleged hair-trigger alert, ready to launch on warning
before a single nuclear explosion has been confirmed.
What about artificial intelligence? There is broad
consensus that artificial intelligence is now progressing
rapidly. Although it is obviously very hard to fore-
cast what will happen many decades from now, espe-
cially if AI turns out to surpass human cognitive abilities
across the board, we can nonetheless draw some conclu-
sions about likely developments in the near term as com-
puters grow progressively more capable. For example,
if we develop computer systems that are more reliable
than people at properly following protocol, the military
will have an almost irresistible temptation to implement
them. We’ve already seen lots of the communications and
command—and even analysis—be computerized in the
military. Now, properly following proper protocol might
sound like a pretty good thing, until you read about the
Stanislav Petrov incident. Why was it, in 1983 when
he got this alarm that the US was attacking the Soviet
Union, that he decided not to pass it along to his supe-
riors? Why did he decide not to follow proper protocol?
Because he was human. If he had been a computer, he
would have followed proper protocol, and some analysts
speculate that a nuclear war might have started.
Another concern is that the more we computerize de-
cision making, the more we take what Kahneman calls
4“system 1” out of the loop [13], and the more likely we
are to lose valuable inhibitions and do dumb things. Sup-
pose that president Putin had a person with him with
whom he was friends, who carried the nuclear launch
codes surgically implanted next to her heart. If the only
way for him to get them was to first stab her to death,
this might make him think twice before starting a nu-
clear war and jeopardizing billions of lives. If instead all
he needs to do is press a button, there are fewer inhibi-
tions. If you have a super-advanced artificial intelligence
system that the president just delegates the decision to,
the inhibitions are even weaker, because he’s not actually
authorizing launch: he’s just delegating his authority to
this system, deciding that if something happens in the
future, then please go ahead and follow proper protocol.
Given our poor human track-record of planning for the
unforeseen (as illustrated in Kubrik’s dark movie classic
“Dr. Strangelove”), I think that this would increase P .
Then there are good old bugs. Has your computer ever
given you the blue screen of death? Let’s hope that the
blue screen of death never turns into the red sky of death.
Although it may be funny if it’s just your unsaved work
that got destroyed, it’s less funny if it’s your planet.
Finally, another current trend seems to be that as AI
systems get more and more advanced, they become more
and more inscrutable black boxes where we just don’t
understand what reasoning they use — but we still trust
them. The GPS in our car recently instructed me to drive
down a remote forest road that ended in an enormous
snow bank. I have no idea how it came to that conclusion,
but I trusted it. If we have a super-advanced computer
system which is telling the Russian military and political
leadership that yes, there is an American missile attack
happening right now, and here’s the cool map with high
resolution graphics showing the missiles, they might just
trust it without knowing how it came to that conclusion.
If the system involved a human, they could ask it how
it made that inference, and challenge its logic and input
data, but if it was fully computerized, it might be harder
to clear up misunderstandings before it was too late.
In summary, we don’t know for sure that AI is going
to increase the risk of accidental nuclear war, but we
certainly can’t say with confidence that it won’t, and it’s
very likely that the effects will be significant one way or
the other. So it would be naive to think that the rise of
artificial intelligence is going to have no impact on P .
IV. OUTLOOK
Let me conclude by considering our place in a cosmic
perspective. 13.8 billion years after our Big Bang, some-
thing remarkable has happened: life has evolved and our
Universe has become aware of itself. This life has done
many fantastic things that are truly inspiring. We’ve cre-
ated great literature, music and film, and by using our
curious minds we’ve been able to figure out more and
more about our cosmos: How old it is, how grand it is
and how beautiful it is. Through this understanding,
we’ve also come to discover technologies that enable us
to take more control and actually start shaping our des-
tiny, giving us the opportunity to make life flourish far
beyond what our ancestors had dreamt of. But we’ve also
done some extremely dumb things here in our universe,
such as building STUPID and leaving it running with its
current knob settings. We don’t yet know what effect AI
and other future developments will have on the P -knob,
but we can’t rule out that things will get even worse.
We professors are often forced to hand out grades, and
if I were teaching Risk Management 101 and had to give
us humans a midterm grade based on our existential risk
management so far, you could argue that I should give
a B- on the grounds that we’re muddling along and still
haven’t dropped the course. From my cosmological per-
spective, however, I find our performance pathetic, and
can’t give more than a D: the long-term potential for life
is literally astronomical, yet we humans are jeopardizing
this future with STUPID, and devote such a tiny fraction
of our attention to reducing X and P that this doesn’t
even become the leading election issue in any country.
Why a D? Why not at least a B-, given that we’re still
not extinct? Many people view things from the tradi-
tional perspective that humans are the pinnacle of evolu-
tion, that life is limited to this planet, and that our focus
should be limited to the next century or even just the
next election cycle. In this perspective, wiping ourselves
out within a century may not seem like such a big deal.
From a cosmic perspective however, that would be ut-
terly moronic. It would be completely na¨ıve in a cosmic
perspective to think that this is as good as it can possibly
get. We have 1057 times more volume at our disposal. We
don’t have another century, but billions of years available
for life to flourish. We have an incredible future oppor-
tunity that we stand to squander if we go extinct or in
other ways screw up. People argue passionately about
what the probability is that we wipe out in any given
year: some guess it’s 1%, some guess much lower proba-
bilities such as 0.0001, some guess higher. Any of these
numbers are just plain pathetic. If it’s 1% we’d expect
to last of order a century, which is pretty far from the
billions of years of potential that we have. Come on, let’s
be a little more ambitious here!
If you still have doubts about whether our priorities are
faulty, ask yourself who is more famous: Vasili Arkhipov
or Justin Bieber? Then ask yourself which one of these
two people should we thank for us all being alive today
because his courageous actions may have singlehandedly
stopped a Soviet nuclear attack during the Cuban Missile
Crisis.
The long-term survival of intelligent life on our planet
is way too important to be left to leaders who have chosen
to build and maintained STUPID. Fortunately, history
holds many examples of how a small number of idealis-
tic individuals can make a large difference for the better.
For example, according to both Reagan and Gorbachev,
a major contributing factor to the deep nuclear cuts that
5they began in the 1980s was the research of that hand-
ful of scientists who discovered nuclear winter. There
are many worthwhile efforts around the globe aimed at
turning down X and/or P . What can you personally do
today to reduce the risk of nuclear apocalypse? Let me
conclude by giving a concrete suggestion. I think that
a strong and simple argument can be made that for any
single country to have more than 200 nuclear weapons is
unethical:
1. Further increases in number cause negligible in-
creases in deterrence: the deterrent effect on a
potential attacker is already about as high as it
can possibly get (please make a list of your 200
largest cities and imagine them suddenly obliter-
ated), and when deployed on submarine-launched
ballistic missiles, they are virtually immune to a
surprise first-strike.
2. This is already at or above the threshold for causing
a catastrophic global nuclear cold spell [7], so in-
creasing the number merely jeopardizes the future
of humanity for no good reason.
If you accept this argument, then the logical conclusion
is to stigmatize all efforts to replace or modernize nuclear
weapons and any people or corporations that do so. The
success in reducing smoking is an example to emulate.
Why has the fraction of smokers in the US plummeted
from 45% in the 1950s to below 18% today, most of whom
say they would like to quit? Smoking hasn’t been banned,
but it has been stigmatized. In the 1950s, smoking was
the cool thing to do, and movie stars and TV anchors
all did it, whereas today’s hip, rich and educated smoke
much less than society’s least fortunate members. After
scientists finally won the debate about whether smok-
ing was harmful, the growing stigma caused ever more
powerful organizations to work against it. Replacing or
modernizing nuclear weapons is clearly worse for human-
ity than smoking, so ask yourself what you can do to
dissuade companies from investing in it. For example,
the non-profit organization “Don’t Bank on the Bomb”
[14] provides all the information that you need to call
your pension fund and encourage them to adopt a pol-
icy of not investing in nuclear weapons. If they ask you
why, you can say “I know that building nuclear weapons
isn’t illegal, but I don’t want my money invested in it,
just as I don’t want it invested in tobacco, gambling or
pornography”. Many large banks, insurance companies
and pension funds have already adopted such nuclear-
free investment policies, and the momentum is growing.
If quadruple-digit nuclear arsenals get the stigma they
deserve and eventually become downsized, this of course
won’t eliminate the threat of nuclear war, but it will be
a huge first step in the right direction.
I was invited to give this talk because I’m the president
of the Future of Life Institute [15], a non-profit organi-
zation which we founded to help make humanity better
stewards of this incredible opportunity we have to make
life flourish for billions of years. All of us founders love
technology — every way in which 2015 is better than the
stone age is because of technology. But we need to learn
to handle technology wisely, and STUPID isn’t wise—as
Einstein put it: “The splitting of the atom has changed
everything except the way we think. Thus we drift to-
wards unparalleled catastrophe.” When we invented fire,
we messed up repeatedly, then invented the fire extin-
guisher. With more powerful technologies such as nu-
clear weapons, synthetic biology and strong artificial in-
telligence, we should instead plan ahead and aim to get
things right the first time, because it may be the only
chance we’ll get.
I’m an optimist and believe that we often underesti-
mate both what we can do in our personal lives and what
life and intelligence can accomplish in our universe. This
means that the brief history of intelligence so far is not
the end of the story, but just the beginning of what I
hope will be billions of years of life flourishing in the cos-
mos. Our future is a race between the growing power
of our technology and the wisdom with which we use it:
let’s make sure that wisdom wins!
Acknowledgments: I wish to thank Helen Caldicott
for inviting me to give the talk upon which this paper is
based, Jesse Galef for help transcribing it, Meia Chita-
Tegmark for helpful feedback and Will Nelson for careful
proofreading.
[1] H. M. Kristensen and R. S. Norris 2014, “Worldwide de-
ployments ofnuclear weapons”, Bull. Atomic Scientists,
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/08/26/
0096340214547619.full.pdf
[2] http://www.justice.gov/civil/
awards-date-04242015
[3] P. J. Crutzen and J. W. Birks 1982, “The atmosphere
after a nuclear war:Twilight at noon”, Ambio,11
[4] R. P. Turco, O. B. Toon, T. P. Ackerman, J. B. Pol-
lack, and C. Sagan 1983, “Nuclear winter: Global con-
sequences of multiple nuclear explosions”, Science, 222,
1283-1292.
[5] V. V. Aleksandrov and G. L. Stenchikov 1983, “On the
modeling of the climatic consequences of the nuclear
war”, Proc. Appl. Math, 21 pp., Comput. Cent., Russ.
Acad. of Sci., Moscow.
[6] A. Robock,. 1984, “Snow and ice feedbacks prolong ef-
fects of nuclearwinter”, Nature, 310, 667-670
[7] A. Robock., L. Oman, and L. Stenchikov 2007, “Nuclear
winter revisited with a modern climate model and current
nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences” , J.
Geophys. Res., 12, D13107
[8] G. A. Schmidt et al. 2006) “Present-day atmospheric sim-
ulations usingGISS ModelE: Comparison to in situ, satel-
6lite, and reanalysis data”,J. Clim.,19, 153-192.
[9] D. Koch, G. A. Schmidt, and C. V. Field 2006), “Sulfur,
sea salt, andradionuclide aerosols in GISS ModelE”, J.
Geophys. Res., 111, D06206
[10] A. Robock and O. B. Toon 2012, “Self-
assured destruction: The climateimpacts of
nuclear war”, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,
http://thebulletin.org/2012/september/
self-assured-destruction-climate-impacts-nuclear-war#
sthash.84cQs2FZ.dpuf
[11] E. Schlosser 2014, “Command and Control: Nuclear
Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of
Safety”, Penguin
[12] L. Gronlund and D. C. Wright 1992, “Depressed Trajec-
tory SLBMs: A Technical Evaluation and Arms Con-
trol Possibilities”, Science & Global Security, 3, 101-
159, https://www.princeton.edu/sgs/publications/
sgs/pdf/3_1-2gronlund.pdf
[13] D. Kahneman 2013), “Thinking, fast and slow”, Farrar,
Straus and Giroux
[14] http://www.dontbankonthebomb.com
[15] http://futureoflife.org
